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“Waiting on the (Music) World to
Change”1
LICENSING IN THE DIGITAL AGE OF MUSIC
INTRODUCTION
The music industry appears to be thriving with constant
record breaking sales2 and more ways to listen to music than
ever before.3 But behind the scenes, government regulation has
struggled to adapt to changes in the industry, leaving industry
players uncertain of the bounds of copyright. Listeners have
their choice of what song to listen to, on what medium, and to an
extent, what they pay (or do not pay) for that music. What
listeners likely never think about is how they are listening to
that music, how the people that write and perform the song are
being paid, and how Taylor Swift’s long absence from Spotify
went deeper than “greed[ ] .”4
U.S. copyright law is in a similar state of ambiguity
regarding music. Copyright in a song is different from many
other works. Each song holds two copyrights: a copyright in the
sound recording and a copyright in the musical composition.5
The sound recording is the final musical product that we hear
played on the radio or in a store, but it is the underlying musical
composition—made up of written music, words, or both by a
1 JOHNMAYER,Waiting on theWorld to Change, onCONTINUUM (Columbia 2006).
2 See John Boone,Here Are All the Records Adele Has Broken with ‘25’ So Far,
ET ONLINE (Dec. 4, 2015, 5:05 PM), http://www.etonline.com/news/177316_all_the_
records_adele_25_has_broken_so_far/ [https://perma.cc/JQA6-YTLC]; Gary Trust,Drake
Breaks Hot 100 Record with 20 Simultaneous Hits, BILLBOARD (May 9, 2016), http://
www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/7358100/drake-hot-100-record-20-simul
taneous-hits-one-dance [https://perma.cc/2RAT-52TH]; Gary Trust, Justin Bieber Breaks
the Beatles&Drake’s Record forMost SimultaneousHot 100Hits, BILLBOARD (Nov. 23, 2015),
http://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/chart-beat/6770428/justin-bieber-breaks-beatles-
drake-record-hot-100 [https://perma.cc/Z992-7WRB].
3 See, e.g., About Us, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/about-us/contact/
[https://perma.cc/C2V4-2Z4Z]; iTunes, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/itunes/ [https://
perma.cc/9VSA-77QF].
4 See Dave Smith, Taylor Swift Is Wrong About Spotify, BUSINESS INSIDER
(May 28, 2015, 5:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/taylor-swift-is-wrong-about-
spotify-2015-5 [https://perma.cc/WYF8-ZXFP].
5 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7) (2012).
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composer or lyricist—that is causing disarray in copyright law,
and the music industry as a result.6
Most songs heard today have more than one writer or
composer.7 The average number of composers per song in 2016
was 4.53—and some of the most popular songs have boasted up
to thirteen co-writers,8 therefore creating more than one owner to
the copyright of the musical composition. In its Copyright Law
Revision of 1976 (Copyright Act), the U.S. House of Representatives
stated that under current law, “co-owners of a copyright would be
treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner having
an independent right to the use [or] license the use of awork, subject
to a duty of accounting to the other co-owners for any profits.”9
Drawing from this default position of copyright law, it follows that
when one of multiple copyright owners of a single musical
composition wants to permit a music user10 to play that composition
publicly, that owner alone may give license.11 This process is known
as full-work licensing.12 The long-standing tradition in the music
industry, however, has been one of fractional licensing, whereby
each owner holds a copyright to a portion of the song, and all must
grant license to a music user in order to secure the rights to a public
performance.13 This seeming derailment from both common law and
U.S. legislation has been a subject of contention for some time, and
definitive steps toward solving the discrepancy began in 2014, in the
6 See infra Part I.
7 Letter from BMI Songwriters, to Chief, Litig. III Sec., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep’t of Just. (Nov. 20, 2015), www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi38.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EGP-5N4U] [hereinafter Letter from BMI Songwriters].
8 See Mark Savage, How Many People Does It Take to Write a Hit Song?, BBC
(May 16, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-39934986 [https://perma.cc/
HN2D-RLKD].
9 H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 121 (1976); see also Cmty. For Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
10 See Music User: Pubs, Restaurants, TV, Radio, Hospitals, Promoters & More.,
SAMRO, http://www.samro.org.za/music-user [https://perma.cc/EV29-WSWW] (“Does your
business or establishment play music in public? If so, that makes you a [m]usic
[u]ser!”); Ben Sisario, How a Justice Department Ruling Could Affect Your Favorite
Musician, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/business/media/
how-a-justice-department-ruling-could-affect-your-favorite-musician.html [https://perma.cc/
ZP44-BNS6].
11 See Coe W. Ramsey, Esq., Music Performing Rights Organizations and the
“Full-Work” vs. “Fractional” Licensing Dispute: Government Seeks to Overturn Fractional
Licensing Decision, LEXOLOGY (May 23, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=5169651d-513b-4047-8263-9a994f0b8193 [https://perma.cc/S2F8-VSBB].
12 Id. The terms “full-work” and “100 percent” licensing are used interchangeably.
13 See Ed Christman, ‘Disappointing’: Publishing Industry Expresses Confusion,
Concern Over Sweeping Dept. of Justice Decision, BILLBOARD (July 5, 2016), http://
www.billboard.com/articles/business/7424128/publishing-industry-ascap-bmi-sony-atv-
umpg-confusion-concern-blanket-licenses-100-percent [https://perma.cc/EUW5-QFLR].
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form of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) review and request for
public comment.14
A major issue with the current regulation of music
licensing is the failure to account for today’s commanding digital
music presence. Music in digital form, such as online radio, paid
streaming subscription services, and downloadable song
purchases has been on the rise since 2003.15 Yet, the instruments
governing music licensing have not been updated in decades.
An official mandate on the use of a full-work versus a
fractional licensing scheme is ineffective and unwarranted
without first modifying the consent decrees governing the two
most prevalent performing rights societies (commonly referred
to as Performing Rights Organizations or PROs),16 which are
responsible for licensing the right to publicly perform musical
compositions, to fit with the current digital age of music. Part I
of this note discusses the background information on the major
PROs as well as the governing instruments that are the basis of
the full-work versus fractional licensing issue. Part II delves into
the differences between full-work and fractional licensing, as
well as advantages, disadvantages, and criticisms to both
schemes. Part III addresses the history and changes of the
consent decrees that govern the two largest PROs and concludes
that the current decrees do not support an explicit mandate on
full-work or fractional licensing. Part IV discusses in detail the
DOJ’s review of the consent decrees, its mandate, and the
subsequent overturn of its decision. Part V provides an in-depth
look into today’s music landscape to illustrate why modification
of the consent decrees is necessary before making any decisions
about full-work versus fractional licensing. This Part also
provides potential amendments and solutions to cure the
outdated nature of the consent decrees and ultimately
recommends a best practice for the consent decrees to account
for the digital age of music, and settle the full-work versus
fractional licensing divide.
I. PERFORMING RIGHTSORGANIZATIONS
PROs are “association[s], corporation[s], or other
entit[ies] that license[ ] the public performance of nondramatic
14 See Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2014, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-bmi-decree-review [https://perma.cc/
8WK7-5FUK].
15 See infra Section V.B.
16 See infra Part III.
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musical works on behalf of copyright owners of such works,”17
and are responsible for collecting and issuing payment for the
public broadcast of these works.18 They distribute the licensing
fees to the songwriters and publishers that hold the copyright.19
The DOJ has recognized the importance of PROs to music users
and music creators alike.20
There are currently four main PROs in the United States,
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) and most recently,
Global Music Rights (GMR).21 In 1941, consent decrees were
placed on BMI and ASCAP to remedy antitrust concerns, namely
the unlawful exercise of market power.22 These decrees imposed
court-mandated requirements to the PROs’ services, such as
obtaining the nonexclusive right from composers to license their
songs23 (as opposed to an exclusive right) so as to not risk
antitrust violations.24 The PROs have long been petitioning the
Antitrust Division of the DOJ (Antitrust Division) to amend
these consent decrees. ASCAP’s decree was last amended in
2001, while BMI’s has not been modified since 1994.25 Though
17 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
18 SeeMusic Publishing Glossary, SONGTRUSTBLOG, http://blog.songtrust.com/
music-publishing-glossary/#PRO [https://perma.cc/68XB-X4XV].
19 See About ASCAP, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/about [https://perma.cc/
2UBT-WCZC]; About, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about [https://perma.cc/4YTA-8KVJ].
20 See Statement of Dep’t of Justice, Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review
of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 10 (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
file/882101/download [https://perma.cc/9GQ3-LXE5] [hereinafter Antitrust Division’s
Closing Review] (“PROs allow music users to obtain immediate access through licenses
that protect them from copyright infringement risk to millions of works controlled by the
hundreds of thousands of songwriters, composers, and publishers that have contributed
songs to the PROs. . . . For many songwriters and composers, affiliating with a PRO and
contributing their works to the PRO’s repertory provides the only practical way of
licensing their works.”).
21 Erin M. Jacobson, Radio Seeks to Pay Songwriters Lower Rates (Again),
FORBES (Nov. 29, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/
2016/11/29/radio-seeks-to-pay-songwriters-lower-rates-again/#5c643f7d3d43 [https://
perma.cc/4EMT-R6QS].
22 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 2. SESAC and GMR are
not subject to consent decrees, though SESAC has had similar antitrust concerns raised in
court.SeeEdChristman,SESACSettles TelevisionClass-Action for $58.5Million, BILLBOARD
(Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6281846/sesac-settles-television-
class-action-for-58-million [https://perma.cc/3LCP-BATB]; Erin M. Jacobson, Radio Seeks to
Pay Songwriters Lower Rates (Again), FORBES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
legalentertainment/2016/11/29/radio-seeks-to-pay-songwriters-lower-rates-again/#5c643f7d
3d43 [https://perma.cc/4EMT-R6QS]. When discussing the consent decrees of the PROs
throughout this note, it refers to BMI and ASCAP only.
23 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civil No.
13-95, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1941).
24 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 2.
25 Press Release, Justice Department Completes Review of ASCAP and BMI
Consent Decrees, Proposing No Modifications at This Time, Dep’t. of Justice, Office of Pub.
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the latest reiteration of the Copyright Act has lasting principles,
“Congress could not have foreseen all of today’s technologies and
the myriad ways consumers and others engage with creative
works in the digital environment.”26 For example, neither decree
takes into account the rising popularity of internet radio27 or the
most popular way Americans listen to music: streaming
services.28 Therefore, the United States Copyright Office
(Copyright Office) requested public comment on the issue of music
licensing in order to issue its report, “Copyright and the Music
Marketplace,”29 regarding whether the current music licensing
practices are effective in today’s digital music landscape.30
In August 2016, the DOJ decided that it would not amend
the consent decrees, as an amendment would “disrupt the status
quo, would not be consistent with the purposes of the consent
decrees, and would not be in the interest of consumers.”31 The
DOJ’s decision concluded that fractional licensing was
inconsistent with the consent decrees of BMI and ASCAP, as
well as the Copyright Act.32 The consent decrees, the DOJ
asserted, mandated a full-work licensing scheme for the two
PROs, whereby only one copyright co-owner need give license for
the public use of the musical composition.33 BMI’s rate court, the
federal court which oversees the public performance royalty
rates set for songwriters and publishers,34 quickly overturned
this mandate.35 Though it is ineffective and counterproductive to
Affairs (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-completes-review-
ascap-and-bmi-consent-decrees-proposing-no-modifications [https://perma.cc/ZS7V-6W5Q].
26 Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comments, 78 Fed.
Reg. 14739, 14740 (Mar. 17, 2014).
27 See Erik Sass, Half of U.S. Listeners Tune Into Online Radio, MEDIA DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 5, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/220860/
half-of-us-listeners-tune-into-online-radio.html [https://perma.cc/J4SP-XC26].
28 NIELSEN, NIELSEN MUSIC YEAR-END REPORT: U.S. 2016 3 (2017), http://
www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/reports-downloads/2017-reports/2016-
year-end-music-report-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTV5-N577].
29 U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THEMUSICMARKETPLACE 14 (2015),
http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GK44-AKJW].
30 See Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comments, 78
Fed. Reg. at 14739.
31 Acting Assistant Att’y Gen. Renata Hesse, Remarks Regarding the Antitrust
Division’s Closing of its Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 2 (Aug. 4, 2016).
32 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 3, 8–9.
33 Id. at 11–13.
34 See Marc D. Ostrow, Why Pandora’s Batting 500 with BMI’s Recent Rate
Court Win, LEXOLOGY (June 4, 2015), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=10be482f-c3da-449d-8b5c-69650f4c3e86 [https://perma.cc/5DBB-SBAX]; Casey Rae,
BMI Scores Higher Royalties in Court, But What Does This Mean for Rate-Setting
Overall?, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (June 2, 2015), https://futureofmusic.org/blog/
2015/06/02/bmi-scores-higher-royalties-court-what-does-mean-rate-setting-overall [https://
perma.cc/UWQ9-NGWQ].
35 United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
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base such decisions on clearly outdated documents, the DOJ and
BMI’s rate court explicitly took the consent decrees into account
when making their respective decisions on the practices of
fractional and full-work licensing.
II. FRACTIONAL VERSUS FULL-WORK LICENSING SCHEMES
There are two types of licensing for a musical
composition—fractional and full-work—which has caused a
divide between the music licensors and the music users, with
each advocating for use of the option that best suits their needs.
The differing opinions of the DOJ and BMI’s rate court
concerning the proper licensing scheme leave this area of
copyright law unsettled. The most dominant PROs in the United
States, ASCAP and BMI, have advocated for the practice of
fractional licensing as opposed to full-work licensing.36 While
this note ultimately argues that the DOJ must amend two
antiquated consent decrees before mandating a type of licensing
scheme, it is important to highlight the fundamental differences
between fractional and full-work licensing in order to better
understand the reasons why. This background demonstrates
why PROs and the owners of musical compositions feel strongly
that fractional licensing, the “longstanding practice of the music
industry,”37 is the more efficient and equitable system, and why,
despite this industry favoritism, the government argues that
full-work licensing is required under the consent decrees of
ASCAP and BMI as well as U.S. Copyright law.
A. Fractional Licensing
Fractional licensing is a scheme by which “each PRO
collects and pays out only the shares of musical works each
represents in its respective repertoire.”38 For instance, if there
are two composers of a musical composition and one belongs to
ASCAP with 60 percent ownership and the other belongs to BMI
with 40 percent ownership, ASCAP may only license its 60
percent ownership of the composition and collect the 60 percent
royalty. The music user would need to obtain the remaining 40
percent from BMI in order to publicly perform the composition.
36 See BMI Members Say “No” to 100% Licensing, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/
advocacy/doj_letter [https://perma.cc/CF75-F659].
37 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE
CONCERNINGPROLICENSINGOFJOINTLYOWNEDWORKS2 (2016), http://www.copyright.gov/
policy/pro-licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DES-RX8W].
38 BMI Members Say “No” to 100% Licensing, supra note 36.
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This has been the longstanding industry practice39 in part
because songwriters select and remain with a specific PRO of
their choosing.40 These composers trust their PRO to value their
work and negotiate a fair rate for licensees, allowing the
composers to rely on their PRO for fair royalty payments.41
PROs license their repertories to music users for a fee,
and then distribute royalties to their affiliated songwriters,
composers, and publishers.42 Under this scheme, the PRO is
therefore only compensated for licensing the portion of the work
it represents. Thus, because a song may be composed by
affiliates of more than one PRO, fractional licensing provides
that a PRO need only worry about distributing royalties to its
affiliates. In practice, fractional licensing means that each PRO
is able to pay out its affiliated composers for their share of the
composition, under each PRO’s own valuation system.43
At face value, a fractional licensing scheme is advantageous
to music composers and publishers, but may disadvantage music
users. Because fractional licensing allows composers to control the
licensing of their portion of the work, each owner may in effect bar
unwanted licensing by a co-owner affiliated with a different PRO.
For example, if copyright co-owner Awants to license to music user
X, but copyright co-owner B does not want to license to music user
X, by B’s refusal to grant license, B is effectively blocking A from
exerting its right to grant license.
Music users need a license for the public performance of
a musical work, whether the performance is a live band playing
at a bar or a playlist in a retail store, so as to not infringe on the
composer’s copyright.44 For music users, fractional licensing
means that in order to receive permission to play certain works
publicly, one must obtain a license from all copyright owners of
the musical composition.45 Though in many cases obtaining a
license from all PROs may be relatively simple due to the small
39 See U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 2.
40 See Letter from BMI Songwriters, supra note 7, at 2.
41 See id. at 1–2.
42 See BMI FAQ, What is BMI, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/faq/category/about
[https://perma.cc/T6PT-SWHH].
43 See BMI Members Say “No” to 100% Licensing, supra note 36. The Copyright
Office has noted that “[n]otwithstanding the default rules of joint copyright ownership,
publishers and songwriters frequently have understandings that they are not free to
license each other’s respective shares.” U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 163.
44 See Nicholas Rubright, 13 Common Questions About Music Licensing for
Businesses, DOZMIA.COM (June 7, 2016), http://blog.dozmia.com/13-common-questions-
about-music-licensing-for-businesses/ [https://perma.cc/VZG7-94XW].
45 Ed Christman, BMI Rate-Court Judge Rules Against Dept. of Justice’s ‘100
Percent’ Licensing Decision, BILLBOARD (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/7511194/bmi-rate-court-judge-rules-against-dept-of-justices-100-percent-
licensing [https://perma.cc/B8DX-A69F].
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number of PROs in the United States, fractional licensing can still
be burdensome on themusic user. In one scenario, amusic usermay
license from all of the major PROs, only to find out that a composer
with a small portion of copyright ownership is not a member of a
major PRO.46 Alternatively, a music user may not have control over
a publicly performed composition and therefore may not have
purchased a license to the works being publicly performed.47
Further, as the DOJ points out, there is no
comprehensive database of ownership of musical compositions
accessible to the public, so that music users can be sure to
acquire licenses from each individual copyright owner.48 This
poses the daunting task for a music user to not only identify the
proper composers and PROs but to also ensure that all necessary
licenses are obtained.49 With four PROs in the mix today, as well
as independent publishers, songs with upwards of ten writers
may require permissions from ten different entities.
Opponents of a fractional licensing scheme argue that it
is in disaccord with U.S. copyright law, the consent decrees of
both ASCAP and BMI,50 and the services that PROs advertise on
their websites.51 The Copyright Act provides that the exclusive
rights in and to a copyright (including the right to publicly
perform the work)52 may be separately owned, such as in joint
works (works in which there is more than one copyright co-
owner, like a song with more than one composer).53 Such co-
owners all possess the right to “grant a non-exclusive license to
use” the whole work without permission of the other owners.54
This means that under U.S. copyright law, the co-owner of a
musical composition is able to grant a nonexclusive license to
another to perform the entire work, which is the basis of the
46 David Oxenford, Esq., DOJ Recommends No Changes in ASCAP and BMI
Consent Decrees, And Requires Full-Work Licensing—How It Affects Music Users,
BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2016/08/articles/
doj-recommends-no-changes-in-ascap-and-bmi-consent-decrees-and-requires-full-work-
licensing-how-it-affects-music-users/ [https://perma.cc/XB27-2R6E].
47 The DOJ pointed out this potential problem in the scenario of a bar that
broadcasts a TV or radio station, whereby music is selected by the producer of the show
or the DJ of the radio station and such song that has not been licensed by the bar. See
Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 14.
48 Id. at 15; Oxenford, supra note 46.
49 See Hesse, supra note 31, at 5.
50 For a more detailed discussion of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees, see
infra Part II.
51 Raza Panjwani, A Closer Look at the Department of Justice’s ASCAP and BMI
Consent Decree Review, PUBLICKNOWLEDGE (July 18, 2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/
news-blog/blogs/a-closer-look-at-the-department-of-justices-ascap-and-bmi-consent-decr
ee-re [https://perma.cc/KH5Q-UNZ6].
52 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012).
53 U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 6.
54 Id.
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alternate scheme of full-work licensing. Public policy arguments
suggest that fractional licensing has “devastating real-world
consequences”55 and is an unfair burden on the music user, given
that “it’s not always obvious who owns what percentage of a
given composition.”56 It is argued that if the PROs are at times
unable to figure this out, it is unreasonable to expect less-
informed music users to understand ownership,57 and therefore
advocate for a full-work approach to licensing.
B. Full-Work Licensing
Full-work licensing is a practice by which every co-owner
of the copyright of the musical composition has the authority to
license the whole work, rather than just the fraction owned.58
For example, if copyright owner A does not want to license to
music user X, but copyright co-owner B does want to license to
music user X, B can effectively override A’s refusal by granting
the full license to X. A full-work licensing scheme for joint-work
musical compositions is plainly consistent with U.S. statutory
and common law.59
Under a full-work licensing scheme, PROs would have
authority to license a full work to a music user, regardless of
whether their composer-affiliate owns five percent of the musical
composition copyright, or one hundred percent of the musical
composition copyright. This does not mean that the remaining
owners who are not affiliated with the licensing PRO will not be
compensated.60 This scheme could involve subjecting a composer
55 Matthew Guarnaccia, Google, Netflix Back DOJ in 2nd Circ. Music
Licensing Fight, LAW360 (May 30, 2017, 8:18 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
929585 [https://perma.cc/RAH8-79MT] (internal quotations omitted).
56 Robert Levine & Ed Christman, The Only Certainty Is Uncertainty: What the
Dept. of Justice’s Decision Means for Music Publishing, BILLBOARD (July 8, 2016), http://
www.billboard.com/articles/business/7431011/understanding-music-publishing-dept-of-
justice-consent-decree [https://perma.cc/ZQQ9-ZFRH].
57 Panjwani, supra note 51.
58 SeeEd Christman,Dept. of Justice Makes Dramatic Change for Music Licensing
Official, Billboard (Aug. 4, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7461614/dept-of-
justice-100-percent-full-works-licensing-official [https://perma.cc/C573-89R7]; see also
Ben Sisario, Justice Department Won’t Alter Music Industry Royalty Rules, NY TIMES
(June 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/media/justice-department-
wont-alter-music-industry-royalty-rules.html [https://perma.cc/KQC2-ELNU].
59 See H.R. REP. No. 94–1476, at 21, 25 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5736, 5752–53; MELVILLE B. NIMMER&DAVIDNIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§6.10[2b] (July 2017).
60 U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 6 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (“Each co-owner may thus grant
a nonexclusive license to use the entire work without the consent of other co-owners,
provided that the licensor accounts for and pays over to his or her co-owners their pro-
rata shares of the proceeds.”).
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to the rates of another PRO, causing the potential for reduced
royalty rates and delayed payment.61
Financial concerns are prevalent in those opposing a full-
work licensing scheme. PROs may charge different licensing
fees,62 and thus might prompt music users to “catalog shop” for
the PRO offering the lowest licensing fee.63 This may be an
unreasonable concern, as there is no incentive for PROs to drop
their rates—a reduction in rates would mean a reduction in PRO
commission.64 Further, “[s]ongwriters can easily terminate the
agreement with a misbehaving PRO and sign up with another
one that prefers more royalties rather than less.”65 A songwriter
is, however, limited in his or her choice of PRO, as BMI and
ASCAP are estimated to control about ninety percent of the
musical works in the United States.66 Additional financial
concerns for music composers stem from royalty payments
flowing through two PROs, the need to monitor and understand
payments, and track bonuses by a PRO that the composer has
“no relationship with,” while tracking if that alternate PRO has
failed to account for any public performances.67
On the other end of the spectrum, music users prefer full-
work licensing because it requires obtaining a license from one
copyright holder, instead of tracking down the potentially
dozens of copyright holders of one work. “A full-work blanket
license from [a PRO] allows the music user to publicly perform,
without risk of copyright infringement liability, all works in the
licensing PRO’s repertory.”68 This scheme is advantageous to a
music user because of the extraordinary number of musical
works, which make it unreasonable for a music user to engage
in individual negotiations with each copyright holder.69 Further,
it appears unreasonable to expect that a music user is able to
61 See BMI Members Say “No” to 100% Licensing, supra note 36.
62 Letter from BMI Songwriters, supra note 7, at 1.
63 Oxenford, supra note 46; see Christman, supra note 58.
64 See Jody Dunitz, Songwriters: The DOJ Got It Right. Your Sky Is Not
Falling, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (July 14, 2016), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/
07/14/songwriters-doj-got-right-100/ [https://perma.cc/XB8F-E8E4]. Dunitz contends
that because ASCAP and BMI control a strong majority of the songs in the United States,
and both oppose full-work licensing, they would not reduce their rates, and smaller
societies “boast that their free-market status gives them greater bargaining leverage to
extract higher royalties.” Id.
65 Id.
66 Dan Horowitz, ASCAP and BMI: Attempting to Strong-Arm the Department of
Justice, TOWNHALL (Mar. 12, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://townhall.com/columnists/danhorowitz/
2016/03/12/ascap-and-bmi-attempting-to-strongarm-the-department-of-justice-n213
2489 [https://perma.cc/D5FU-PLLD].
67 Letter from BMI Songwriters, supra note 7, at 1.
68 Hesse, supra note 31, at 5.
69 Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC., 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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identify all of the proper parties from whom permission is
needed to obtain a license.70
The consent decrees require BMI and ASCAP to provide
music users the ability to perform all compositions and works
respectively.71 In explaining the DOJ’s decision that full-work
licensing is to be the new norm, former Acting Assistant Attorney
General Renata Hesse remarked that the Antitrust Division
“concluded that only full-work licenses could fulfill the purpose
and meaning of the requirement in the consent decrees that
ASCAP and BMI offer blanket licenses that provide users the
ability to play all the songs in the PROs’ repertories.”72 The DOJ
has interpreted the consent decrees as inconsistent with
fractional licensing73 because a music user would not be able to
perform all of the works in a PROs’ repertory without obtaining
licenses from the PRO of a copyright co-owner under a fractional
licensing scheme, thus perpetuating the need for full-work
licensing to be the new normal.74
Further, the DOJ pointed out that the continuation of the
use of the PROs’ blanket licenses75 depends on a full-work
licensing scheme because those licenses “[allow] the licensee
immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay or
prior individual negotiations, and great flexibility in the choice
of musical material.”76 The DOJ admitted, however, that full-
work licensing may make it impossible to offer blanket licenses
if co-owners of a work impose limitations on one another’s ability
to license the song.77 While the DOJ offered no justification for
this limitation, the deterrent against copyright co-owners
imposing these limitations might be that, under the DOJ’s
interpretation, full-work licensing is the only option. An
additional concern may be that the refusal to license a song
70 Id.
71 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ. Action
No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001); United States v.
Broad. Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
72 Hesse, supra note 31, at 4.
73 See infra Section III.D.
74 See Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 11–12.
75 United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 627 F. 3d
64, 68 (2d. Cir. 2010) (“A blanket license . . . gives the licensee the right to perform all of
the works in the repertory for a single stated fee that does not vary depending on how
much music from the repertory the licensee actually uses.”).
76 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 12 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22
(1979)). The Department of Justice rationalizes the need for a full-work license by stating
that fractional licenses would not provide for the “immediate use of covered
compositions” because users would need to gather licenses from all of the other copyright
holders before publicly performing the work. Id. (emphasis in original).
77 Id. at 13.
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would result in no public performance of the work, and thus no
public performance royalties issued to the composers.
Because PROs have established their payment distribution
based on fractional licensing, commentators argue that a shift to
full-work licensing may “require that they change the way that
they account for payments” to composers and songwriters.78
Problems may arise, for example, if a BMI-affiliated composer co-
owns a song with an affiliate-composer of SESAC, which is not
subject to a consent decree. If a collaboration exists amongst a BMI
composer and a SESAC composer, SESAC is still able to license
only its owned fraction of the song, creating inconsistency and an
unequal distribution of the power of each PRO to license a
collaborative work.79 Music composers have expressed dismay
for a full-work licensing scheme, citing financial and creative
impacts the new system could have on their lives.80 Songwriters
fear that in order to keep their works within their desired PRO,
they would be limited on a choice of collaborators.81
The decision on which licensing scheme to implement is
a challenging one, as the practices under a fractional or full-work
license are so vastly different. Due to reliance on the consent
decrees in interpreting which scheme is lawful, it follows that
without clarity of the consent decrees regarding today’s music
landscape, mandating one scheme over another in today’s music
world is unreasonable.
III. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSENTDECREES
Underlying this whole debate are consent decrees
developed over seventy-five years ago. ASCAP voluntarily
entered into its consent decree after a 1941 lawsuit that the DOJ
filed82 for alleged “violation of . . . the Sherman Act.”83 BMI also
entered into a consent decree with nearly identical terms.84
78 Oxenford, supra note 46.
79 See Levine & Christman, supra note 56.
80 See Letter from BMI Songwriters, supra note 7, at 1. (“[A] shift to [full-work]
licensing would severely impact our creative freedom, our ability to choose which PRO
licenses our music and, ultimately, our livelihood as songwriters.”); see also Ben
Haggerty & Ryan Lewis, Comment Letter on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Review of the BMI
and ASCAP Consent Decrees (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi54.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM82-K8V4].
81 Letter from BMI Songwriters, supra note 7, at 1–2; BMI Members Say “No”
to 100% Licensing, supra note 36.
82 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ.
Action No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
83 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 2; see Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2012).
84 Music Licensing History, NRBMLC, http://www.nrbmlc.com/music-licensing/
music-licensing-history/ [https://perma.cc/2VZY-7FPX].
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Under the consent decrees, ASCAP and BMI are required to
“offer to radio and television stations program licenses that
make the full catalogue available on an individual program
basis.”85 The DOJ amended both of the PROs’ consent decrees
throughout the years to reflect industry changes, such as pre-
recorded music incorporated into motion pictures86 and the
advent of television.87 These decrees do not “anticipate how
changes in technology and consumer habits alter market
mechanisms and the effect of the consent decree itself will have
on how market actors behave.”88 Naturally, neither of the
consent decrees takes into account internet radio or streaming
services as they were not prevalent sources of music
consumption at the time of their most recent updates. This
means that PROs must use consent decrees—originally aimed
at regulating the licensing for traditional broadcast radio in the
mid-twentieth century89—to now guess how to license music in
2017, where the main consumption is through digital mediums.
At sixteen and twenty-three years since the latest amendments,
the time has come to update these decrees.
A. History of the Consent Decrees
ASCAP was founded in 1914 to “protect the rights of
composers and collect fees for the public performances of their
music.”90 When public performances expanded from live, in-
person performances to include radio broadcasts and broadcast
reproductions, ASCAP grew in size of members, and profit,
eventually gaining “control of the great bulk of music in
commercial demand” and cementing itself as a strong player in
the performance-rights industry.91
85 Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing
Rights in Broadcasting, 24.COLUM. VLAJ.L.&ARTS349, 351 (2001) (emphasis in original).
86 Music Licensing History, supra note 84.
87 The broadcasting medium of television was not accounted for in BMI’s initial
consent decree, but was introduced in its 1966 decree and further amended by the 1994
revision. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21476
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
88 Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem
of the Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA&ENT. L.J. 733, 733–34 (1998).
89 Music Licensing History, supra note 84.
90 ASCAP, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/ASCAP
[https://perma.cc/X4FH-3U27].
91 Richard W. Ergo, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable
Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. 258, 260–61 (1959).
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BMI was created in 1939 as an alternative to ASCAP,92
which continued to be the most prevalent PRO in the United
States and held most of the power in music licensing.93 In 1941,
the United States sued ASCAP for antitrust violations and
concerns over market abuse;94 the suit was an attempt to balance
the power of the PRO, since at the time, only a copyright in the
musical composition (and not the sound recording) existed,
which tilted licensing power in the PROs’ favor. With ASCAP
dominating the industry, there were fears that it had a
monopolist power over the licensing of musical repertories.95 Key
provisions to the ASCAP consent decree include that ASCAP
must grant a license to anyone who requests one, must not differ
in license price to those similarly situated, and must not attempt
to restrict any licensee from public performance in order to
receive additional consideration.96
B. Modifications to the Consent Decrees
Throughout the years, modifications have been made to
both consent decrees. ASCAP’s main revision came in 1950
(Amended Final Judgment) and created a rate court with
jurisdiction to hear discrepancies in licensing fees between
ASCAP and its licensees when the parties are unable to reach
an agreement.97 BMI’s consent decree was first modified in 1966,
and is the basis of most parts of the current decree,98 though it
contained no such rate court provision.99Manymodifications and
additions coincided with the advent of television and motion
picture popularity.100 After the creation of audiovisual films,
ASCAP was ordered to change its practices to coincide with this
92 See BMI’s Timeline Through History, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/about/75_
years [https://perma.cc/HWU3-S4K4].
93 ASCAP-BMI Consent Decrees, FUTURE OFMUSIC COALITION (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees [https://perma.cc/
R449-7FE5].
94 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 2.
95 Id. (The DOJ alleged that ASCAP “unlawfully exercised market power
acquired through the aggregation of public performance rights.”).
96 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civil
No. 13-95, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944, at *4, 8–11(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1941).
97 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civil
Action No. 13-95, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4341, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950).
98 Change is Now: What is the Consent Decree, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/pdfs/
advocacy/about_bmi_consent_decree.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KWX-TZBJ].
99 See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., Civ. No. 64 Civ. 3787, 1966 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10449 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1966).
100 See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4341, at *4–5, 7–11, 16.
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technological advance.101 BMI’s 1966 decree modifications are
interpreted to expand to television.102
The ASCAP Amended Final Judgment was further
amended in 1960, and again by the most current consent decree,
amended in 2001 (the Second Amended Final Judgment).103 The
most recent amendment to the BMI consent decree was in 1994,
which included the addition of a rate court.104 Today, the consent
decrees of ASCAP and BMI read almost the same.
Due to the fact that both consent decrees were last
amended before the prevalence of digital music programs, a
change in the consent decrees is warranted. Looking back on
previous decree amendments, it is inconsistent with past
practices that the consent decrees have not been updated to
reflect industry change. This leaves the music world today with
a mandated licensing scheme tailored for a world that existed
two decades ago. Without an amendment for today’s music
landscape, any decision based off the consent decrees is rendered
virtually automatically antiquated.
C. The Future of the Consent Decrees
Changes to the ASCAP decree were made to address
antitrust concerns,105 however, these antitrust concerns are also
a statutory cover for changes made for policy interests like
changes in technology. The Amended Final Judgment provided
for a number of changes due to antitrust concerns over ASCAP’s
monopoly, but these changes would not have happened if not for
the popularity of motion pictures. Similarly, the Second
Amended Final Judgment was made pursuant to a shift in the
music industry created by “the growth of cable television and the
emergence of the Internet.”106 These changes were still largely
under the guise of antitrust concerns.107 While antitrust issues
101 See id. at *4–5, 7–9, 16.
102 See Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10449, at *8–9. The
original BMI consent decree, entered into in 1941 explicitly discussed radio broadcasting,
while the 1966 amendment no longer mentioned radio explicitly. See Full Text of Consent
Decree in U.S. v. BMI Case, BROADCASTING, Feb. 3, 1941, at 24.
103 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Civ.
Action No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
104 See United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 64 Civ. 3787, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21476, *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
105 See supra Section III.B.
106 ASCAP, Comment Letter on U.S. Copyright Office Music Licensing Study,
Docket No. 2014-03, 11 (May 23, 2014), http://www.copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensing
study/comments/Docket2014_3/ASCAP_MLS_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/X498-MYG5].
107 See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at
*1 (The Second Amended Final Judgment states that relief may be granted against
ASCAP pursuant to § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
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surely existed in these two instances, the changes made had
much to do with the progression of the music industry and
American society as a whole. Certainly, the Second Amended
Final Judgment provided for Internet and cable television
popularity (a large step forward), but many more changes and
advancements in the music industry have occurred since, and
thus necessitate further amendments to both consent decrees in
order to adhere to the digital age of music.
Neither consent decree allows publishers to “partially
withdraw[ ] just portions of their rights,” therefore requiring
that the PROs “administer all public performance rights for a
given composition . . . or none of them.”108 This means that
publishers and composers wishing to eliminate their works from
certain avenues, such as streaming services, cannot do so
without completely disassociating themselves from their PRO,109
the consequences of which include independently licensing out a
musical composition, keeping track of how often that composition is
publicly performed, and collecting one’s own fees. Issues arise where
some of the biggest names inmusic have refused to have their works
streamed.110 The DOJ made no decision regarding partial
withdrawal due to the uncertainty of the effects of such withdrawal
and its public policy implications.111 In light of the digital age of
music, it would behoove the DOJ to consider an amendment to the
consent decrees of both BMI and ASCAP to allow for exceptions or
independent reviews for certain public performances, such as plays
on streaming and Internet radio services, particularly before any
decision on a proper licensing scheme is made.
D. The Consent Decrees’ Position on Licensing Schemes
The main cause of strife in the licensing decisions has
been whether the consent decrees require or provide for full-
work licensing over fractional licensing or vice versa. The plain
language of the consent decrees has on occasion been interpreted
to support full-work licensing, as ASCAP’s consent decree states
it must grant music users “a non-exclusive license to perform all
108 FUTURE OFMUSIC COALITION, supra note 93.
109 See Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers,
785 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 2015) (Affirming ASCAP’s rate court that ASCAP may not
withdraw any rights from Pandora to perform any compositions licensed to them under
the consent decree).
110 SeeMaeve McDermott, 4 Artists You Won’t See on Streaming Services, USA
Today (Dec. 23, 2015, 12:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2015/12/23/
artists-against-streaming-services-prince-garth-brooks-thom-yorke-pete-townshend/
77824882 [https://perma.cc/79C4-32GE].
111 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 17.
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of the works in the ASCAP repertory.”112 The ability to perform
all of the works in the repertory seems to align with the idea of
full-work licensing, in that if you have a license from ASCAP,
you have the ability to perform, without seeking licensure
elsewhere. The language, however, does not explicitly denounce
a fractional licensing scheme, as “the decrees—like any
contract—must be interpreted in light of the prevailing customs
of the industry.”113 Thus, the plain language of the consent
decrees forces PROs to look elsewhere to determine which
licensing scheme to follow.
The Copyright Office is one source that can provide PROs
with this needed guidance. The Copyright Office points out that,
considering the definition of “repertory”114 in the decrees,
rejecting the practice of fractional licensing, “would mean that
the ASCAP and BMI repertoires must exclude any work for
which the PRO could offer only a partial license, since there
would be no ‘right’ to license the entire work,”115 because the
blanket licenses provided to music users “allow[ ] the licensee
immediate use of covered compositions.”116 Under a fractional
scheme, immediate use would not be possible in a joint work by
co-owner affiliates of both BMI and ASCAP, because there would
be a need for the music user to obtain a license from the other
party. Without the use of fractional licensing, many works may
be rendered unavailable. In contrast, without the use of a full-
work scheme, the PROs may not be operating in accordance with
the blanket licenses that they are issuing to music users. This
difficult decision magnifies the complexity of the situation and
the need for explicit clarification in the consent decrees.
While the DOJ decided that the consent decrees “require
[the PROs] to offer full-work licenses,”117 critics argue that the
DOJ misread its own laws. Interpretations of ASCAP’s consent
decree contend that ASCAP cannot “continue to license and
collect the share of a former member who has licensed his share
to another PRO. Yet, this is exactly what the DOJ says that
ASCAP must now do.”118 While this is a valid interpretation of
112 Panjwani, supra note 51 (emphasis added) (quoting Am. Soc’y of Composers,
Authors and Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *4).
113 U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 13 (footnote omitted).
114 Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *1
(defining repository as “those works . . . the right of public performance of which [the
PRO] has or hereafter shall have the right to license at the relevant point in time”).
115 U.S. COPYRIGHTOFFICE, supra note 37, at 14 (emphasis in original).
116 Broad. Music, Inc. v. Colum. Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1978).
117 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 3.
118 Stephen Carlisle, ASCAP and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad DOJ
Decision That’s Going to Create Chaos in the Music Industry, Copyright Nova Southern
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the consent decrees, it must be noted that this language does not
expressly deny full-work licensing. The language of the cited
provision of the consent decree references former members of
ASCAP who later leave for a different PRO.119
The plain language of the BMI and ASCAP consent
decrees does not provide for an express mandate on fractional
versus full-work licensing, and any decision on a licensing scheme
is susceptible to various interpretations and a constant back-and-
forth when relying on the decrees to determine proper licensing
practice. Therefore, amendments to the decrees to account for
prevalent uses and customs in today’s music industry must be
instated before any decision on fractional versus full licensing can
be firmly established. Due to the fact that streaming and Internet
radio are major sources of music consumption today,120
committees to oversee licensure to such music users is in the best
interest of all parties.121
IV. THEDEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S REFUSAL TO AMEND THE
CONSENT DECREES
The history of the DOJ’s recent decision, and the BMI
rate court’s subsequent overturn highlights the importance of
why a decision by the DOJ mandating a full-work or fractional
licensing scheme cannot be made operative without first
amending the consent decrees. In 2014, the Antitrust Division
entered into a review of the BMI and ASCAP consent decrees.122
Of particular interest was the “competitive concerns that arise
from the joint licensing of music by [PROs] and the remediation
of those concerns.”123 The Antitrust Division solicited public
comments on an array of issues and received a wide range of
responses on both sides of the argument by individuals and
corporations alike.124 Both sides advocated for some form of
change to the decrees.125Unsurprisingly, many artists, composers,
University (Aug. 12, 2016), http://copyright.nova.edu/ascap-terrible-horrible-no-good-bad-doj-
decision-thats-going-create-chaos-music-industry/ [https://perma.cc/F6NQ-CG2G].
119 See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 2001 WL 1589999, at *10.
120 See infra Section V.B.
121 For a discussion of such a committee, see infra Section V.D.
122 EdChristman,U.S. Dept. of Justice to ReviewASCAPandBMIConsent Decrees,
Billboard (June 4, 2014, 2:16 AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-
management/6106492/us-dept-of-justice-to-review-ascap-and-bmi-consent [https://perma.cc/
8B5W-LGPM].
123 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14.
124 See id.
125 See, e.g., Future of Music Coalition, Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Division Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (2014), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307749.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XBT-
GAR5] (advocating for the decrees to remain in place, but suggesting amendments to make
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and publishers advocated for an amendment or elimination, while
many business owners and licensees advocated for the decrees to
remain in place.
After receiving a multitude of public comments, the
Antitrust Division extended its inquiry in 2015,126 as a result of
previous comments recommending, “additional modifications
regarding ASCAP’s and BMI’s licensing practices related to
jointly owned works.”127 The DOJ cited to language in each of the
consent decrees suggesting that licenses have been granted to
provide licensees “to play all works in their repertories, whether
partially or fully owned.”128 This notion is in direct contrast with
the historical industry practice of licensing on the fractional
ownership of the copyright that each co-owner holds.129 This
inquiry solicited more comments, resulting again in an expected
division between publishers and their PROs,130 andmusic users.131
the decrees more beneficial and fair in practice); SAG-AFTRA, Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Division Antitrust Consent Decree Review 3–5 (2014), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/307818.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN24-
LVJQ] (advocating for a complete overhaul of the decrees).
126 See ASCAP and BMI Consent Decree Review Request for Public Comments
2015, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-and-bmi-consent-decree-
review-request-public-comments-2015 [https://perma.cc/B9JF-DMR5].The DOJ requested
comments on what the licenses actually provide, potential risk of infringement for users
who have licensedwith only one PRO, and public interest questions arising from a potential




130 See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Comment on the
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Review of PRO Licensing of Jointly Owned Works
1–2 (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FH8K-CPKS] (ASCAP advocating for fractional licensing and against
full-work licensing); BroadcastMusic, Inc., Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust
Division Review of Consent Decree in United States v. Broad. Music, Inc. 2–3 (Nov, 20,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi18.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FE9A-NDMW] (BMI advocating for fractional licensing and against full-work licensing);
Wixen Music Publishing Inc., Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division
Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi114.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E4S-KTD5] (Wixen, a music
publisher advocating for fractional licensing and against full-work licensing).
131 See, e.g., American Beverage Licensees, Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Antitrust Division Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 2 (Nov. 20,
2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi12.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/HSP6-CENK] (the American Beverage Licensees advocating for full-work licensing
and against fractional licensing); Media Licensees, Comment on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Division Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 2–4 (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ascapbmi2015/ascapbmi19.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X
64-5KRK] (a collective group of music users advocating for full-work licensing and
against fractional licensing).
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In August 2016, the DOJ closed its review with a decision
that “sent an earthquake rumbling through the music industry.”132
The DOJ stated that not only would the consent decrees remain
without amendment, but that a plain reading of the decrees
requires ASCAP and BMI to operate under a full-work licensing
scheme as opposed to its traditional practice of fractional
licensing.133 The conclusion of the Antitrust Division was that “it
would not be in the public interest tomodify the . . . consent decrees
to permit . . . fractional licens[ing].”134 The rationale behind the
decision was that any change would impair the public performance
market, undermine the PROs’ traditional role in “providing
protection from unintended copyright infringement liability,” and
potentially limit the public performance of music.135
In explaining the decision to stick with the outdated
consent decrees, despite the changed landscape of music
consumption, the Antitrust Division explained that the it “could
not assess the likely impact of [modifying the consent decrees]
without first understanding precisely what is granted by the
PROs’ licenses.”136 But, circularly, the Antitrust Division stated
that the determination to mandate full-work licensing began
“with the language of the consent decrees themselves.”137
After the DOJ issued its decision, BMI and ASCAP
released a joint statement, demonstrating unity in their
disappointment and in future plans.138 A change in legislation is
a promising remedy as ASCAP has many allies in its endeavor
to make fractional licensing the law.139 Indeed, the DOJ even
132 Jon Healey, Justice Department Rocks Music Industry with ASCAP-BMI
Decision, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2016, 10:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-
ed-ascap-bmi-justice-department-20160804-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/E7TG-KTF4].
133 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 11–12 (“[T]he plain text of
the decrees cannot be squared with an interpretation that allows fractional licensing.”).
134 Id. at 13.
135 Id. at 13, 15; Further, the Division declined to modify the consent decrees in
any other way because doing so “during this uncertain period could complicate the
industry’s move to a shared approach with full clarity for all industry participants as to
the rights conveyed by the PRO’s licenses.” Id. at 17.
136 Hesse, supra note 31, at 3 (the question of what is granted by the PROs’
license centers around whether fractional or full schemes are required).
137 Id. at 4.
138 See ASCAP and BMI Join Forces to Fight the Department of Justice’s
Interpretation of Their Consent Decrees, ASCAP (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.ascap.com/
press/2016/08-04-ascap-bmi-join-forces-to-fight-doj.aspx [https://perma.cc/MM6P-QCZZ]
(“United in their belief that the DOJ’s decision to mandate 100% licensing will cause
unnecessary chaos in the marketplace and place unfair financial burdens and creative
constraints on songwriters and composers, the two organizations are pursuing a joint
campaign: BMI through litigation and ASCAP through legislative reform.”).
139 Eighteen members of Congress have signed a letter to Attorney General
Loretta Lynch “calling for the [DOJ] to reconsider its decision on 100%, or ‘full-works’
licensing.” Andy Gensler, Congress Members Send Attorney General Letter Urging Dept. of
Justice to Reverse Songwriting Decision: Exclusive, BILLBOARD (Sept. 28, 2016, 3:46 PM),
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dedicated a section in its decision to concede that the consent
decrees are “inherently limited in scope.”140 It also suggested that
the decrees could be modified “through a legislative solution that
brings performance rights licensing under a similar regulatory
umbrella as other rights,” and further “encourages the
development of a comprehensive legislative solution.”141 While both
PROs were given a one-year grace period to transition their
practices to fit this newmandate,142 each began taking steps to halt
the change to full-work licensing.
BMI requested a pre-motion conference in its rate court
immediately after the issuance of the DOJ’s decision.143 BMI
refuted the DOJ’s finding, stating that the Antitrust Division
erred in its interpretation of the consent decrees, case law, and
the public interest.144 Further, BMI sought a declaration that
full-work licensing is not required under the consent decree, and
if it is required, the court should implement a modification of the
decree that would allow BMI to continue to license
fractionally.145 If the rate court agreed with the DOJ, BMI sought
a final order stating so, along with an order granting BMI ample
time to conform to the full-work licensing scheme.146
Just over a month after the DOJ’s decision, BMI’s rate
court issued an opinion reversing the DOJ’s mandate147 before
either party entered a motion.148 The judge eventually came to
the conclusion that the BMI consent decree “neither bars
fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing.”149 For BMI,
this means that they may continue their practice of fractional
licensing.150 After much speculation due to the changing
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/7525693/congress-members-send-attorney-general-
letter-urging-dept-of-justice-to-reverse [https://perma.cc/M5QL-U4MF].
140 Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 22.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 17.
143 See Pre-Motion Conference Letter, United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No.
64 Civ. 3787, ECF No. 87 at 1–2 (Aug. 4, 2016).
144 Id at 2.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 SeeUnitedStates v. Broad.Music, Inc., 207F. Supp. 3d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
148 Ed Christman, Publishing Industry Praises BMI Consent-Decree Decision—
But Outcome Remains Unclear, BILLBOARD (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/7511350/publishing-industry-praises-bmi-consent-decree-decision-but-out
come-remains [https://perma.cc/QV39-7FCU] (Fakler, a partner at Arent Fox LLP who
represents digital services, told Billboard: “Nobody expected him to rule on what had so
far been submitted. Neither side had even put in a motion yet.”).
149 Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d at 377.
150 Christman, supra note 45.
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administration,151 the DOJ filed an appeal to the BMI rate court
decision on May 18, 2017.152
Currently, there are two different mandates on licensing
schemes based on two almost identical consent decrees.153 This
kind of inconsistency marks a time of extreme uncertainty in the
music industry. Both the DOJ and BMI’s rate court have relied
on the consent decrees heavily in making their decision on
fractional versus full-work licensing, and have come out on
opposite sides of the coin.154
In order to maintain consistency in the music industry
and marketplace, it is clearer than ever that a decision on
licensing cannot be administered without first amending the
consent decrees. A constant shifting of the system, made possible
by appeals from both parties, a potential inconsistent decision
from ASCAP’s rate court, and a lengthy legislative reform effort
would mean that music users, publishers, composers, and PROs
alike will all face uncertainty in what is the proper practice.
Such uncertainty opens a floodgate of legal battles between
music users, music composers, PROs, and publishers.
The consent decrees, which must be interpreted within
their four corners, do not provide for the contemporary needs of
the PROs, as there is currently no way to interpret the consent
decrees within the scope of digital music.155 While this “four
corner” interpretation is to protect the waiver of litigation that
the PRO agrees to when voluntarily entering into a consent
decree, if “the wording is susceptible to more than one
reasonable construction, then the court must look to extrinsic
151 See Ed Christman, Department of Justice Appeals Consent Decree Ruling, BMI
Hits Back, BILLBOARD (May 18, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7800
937/department-justice-appeals-consent-decree-bmi-comment [https://perma.cc/9SAW-J
HGX]; Robert Levine, Songwriters of North America File Motion to Proceed in DOJ Consent
Decree Lawsuit: Exclusive, BILLBOARD (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/
business/7685106/songwriters-of-north-america-file-motion-to-proceed-in-doj-consent-decree
[https://perma.cc/6L32-VUNW].
152 See Brief for Appellant United States of America at 1, United States v.
Broad.Music, Inc., 16-3830-CV, ECF No. 49 (May 18, 2017), http://www.djcounsel.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/2017-DOJ-Brief-BMI-Full-Work-Licensing.pdf [https://perma.cc/
P8ZV-EFND].
153 See Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d at 377 (BMI may operate under
fractional licensing as per its rate court); Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note
20 at 3 (ASCAP is under the control of the DOJ decision mandating full-work licensing
as it has not appealed to its rate court for a judgment allowing the continuation of
fractional licensing.).
154 See Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d at 377 (“The Consent Decree neither
bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing.”); Antitrust Division’s Closing
Review, supra note 20, at 12 (“[T]he [C]onsent [D]ecrees must be read as requiring full-
work licensing.”).
155 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 782
F. Supp. 778, 787–88 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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evidence.”156 In looking to such extrinsic evidence, it is clear that
digital music services are becoming more and more prevalent,
and it would therefore be in the best interest of the public and
the PROs to explicitly provide unambiguous terms in the
consent decrees to bind the PROs to certain practices concerning
digital music services. Accordingly, changes in the decrees must
be made to fit for the digital age of music before any legislative
or judicial decision on licensing can be effectively made without
compromising the integrity of the music industry.
V. A MANDATE ON A LICENSING SCHEME CANNOT BEMADE
WITHOUT AMENDMENT TO THE CONSENTDECREES
Since the consent decrees were last amended, there has
been a significant and undeniable change in the music industry.
The scheme of licensing is at the core of how the music industry
compensates its artists and how it publicly broadcasts works. It
is against past practices, public policy, and general common
sense not to modify the consent decrees to fit in to today’s music
landscape, which is so vastly different from the time of the
decrees’ most recent amendments. The consent decrees of
ASCAP and BMI should reflect this change in the industry.157 As
the licensing decision is largely based off of the content of the
consent decrees, this must be done before any mandate on full-
work versus fractional licensing can be made.
A. Inconsistencies with Regard to Licensing Schemes Will
Persist Without Amendments to the Consent Decrees
The debate of fractional versus full licensing for PROs
will continue endlessly without amendments to the consent
decrees. This results from both the DOJ and BMI’s rate court’s
heavy reliance on the consent decrees to determine whether full
or fractional licensing is required, yet each reached a decision on
the opposite end of the spectrum.158 Opinions on the issue will
156 Id.
157 See id. at 783–84 (“The [1950] amendment of the Decree was . . . instigated
by a number of related developments . . . television began to be recognized as a
potentially significant transmitter of programming to the American public. It therefore
became necessary to address the manner in which its use of copyrighted music would be
licensed.”).
158 The Department of Justice stated that “the plain text of the decrees cannot
be squared with an interpretation that allows fractional licensing,” and that “the consent
decrees must be read as requiring full-work licensing.” Antitrust Division’s Closing
Review, supra note 20, at 11–12. While BMI’s Rate Court ruled that BMI’s decree
“neither bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing.” Broad. Music, Inc.,
207 F. Supp. 3d at 377.
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continue to differ because each scheme skews an advantage to one
side. A music user will advocate for a full-work licensing scheme
because it keeps them better protected from copyright
infringement. Music publishers and PROs will prefer a fractional
license because it is simply better for business and compensation.159
Amendment to both consent decrees is particularly
important when considering the music landscape today. Change
is warranted as copyright law has continued to evolve to
accommodate changes and advancements in technology.160 It is
increasingly difficult for PROs to comply with the current consent
decrees when they are based on decades-old practices of music
consumption and do not take into consideration important factors,
such as how to fairly compensate a composer when a user has a
song at his or her fingertips for free via digital streaming. Further,
consent decree modification “may be warranted when changed
factual conditions make compliance with the decree substantially
more onerous.”161 It is therefore appropriate to consider changes to
meet today’s digital age of music.162
B. Amending the Consent Decrees to Fit with the Digital
Age of Music is Consistent with Past Practices
Just as the consent decrees were altered to account for pre-
recorded music in motion pictures and cable television,163 it follows
that they should each now be altered to adhere with the popularity
of digital music use.164 It is of note that of the two consent decrees,
ASCAP’s provides more specific provisions and its last amendment
came seven years after BMI’s last amendment. In giving the
current decrees the benefit of the doubt for evaluation, ASCAP’s
later modification date of 2001 will serve as the benchmark for
159 See supra Section II.A; see also David Balto, Modifying the Music Consent
Decrees Without Clear Goals Will Harm Consumers, THE HILL (July 5, 2015, 10:00 A.M.),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/246725-modifying-the-music-consent-decrees-without-
clear-goals-will-harm [https://perma.cc/7KGU-QVY4].
160 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
161 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992).
162 In 2014, weekly estimates of streaming amounted to 67% of Americans
and streaming is only growing in popularity. Everyone Listens to Music, But How We
Listen Is Changing, Media and Entertainment, NIELSEN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://
www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/everyone-listens-to-music-but-how-we-listen-is-
changing.html [https://perma.cc/7PTQ-F3KP]. In 2016, audio streams were up 76% from
the previous year. NIELSEN, supra note 28, at 3 (2017).
163 See supra Section III.B for a discussion of these consent decree amendments.
164 In a 2016 survey, 57 percent of Americans ages twelve and over listened to
Internet radio in the past month. See Nancy Vogt, Audio: Fact Sheet, in STATE OF THENEWS
MEDIA 2016 68–69 (2016), https://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/
06/30143308/state-of-the-news-media-report-2016-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X69Q-XN9S].
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determining if the consent decrees, as they stand today, are fit for
the current music landscape.
In 2001, the revolution to how people consume music was in
its infancy. In November 2001, the first iPod was released.165 Apple
opened the iTunes Music Store in April 2003.166 It sold one million
songs in its first week of operation,167 and by September of the same
year, ten million songs had been downloaded.168 By July 2004 one
hundred million songs had been downloaded from the store,169
demonstrating an extremely quick progression of digital music sales
at a time when broadband had yet to overtake dial-up Internet.170
iTunes went on to be the most dominant music seller, overtaking
physical stores that previously commanded the market.171
Four years after the latest consent decree amendment in
2001,172 Internet radio was born. In November 2005, Pandora’s
free public internet radio was fully launched, becoming the first
digital service of its kind.173 Spotify followed, launching in the
United States in 2011.174 In 2015 and 2016 respectively, Apple
Music and Pandora Premium were launched, likely to compete
directly with Spotify.175 Additional streaming services have since
165 Billboard Staff, From SoundJam to 25 Billion Songs Sold: An iTunes Timeline





168 Luke Dormehl, Today in Apple History: iTunes Store Hits 10 Million Music
Downloads, CULTOFMAC (Sept. 8, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cultofmac.com/444689/today-
apple-history-itunes-store-hits-10-million-music-downloads/ [https://perma.cc/3TVL-RGXJ].
169 Billboard Staff, supra note 165.
170 World Wide Web Timeline, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 11, 2014), http://
www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/world-wide-web-timeline/ [https://perma.cc/VR5W-L8YB].
171 See iTunes Overtakes Wal-Mart In Music Sales, CBS News (Apr. 4, 2008, 8:47
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/itunes-overtakes-wal-mart-in-music-sales/ [https://per
ma.cc/D8JX-BVBE].
172 Dep’t. of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 25.
173 See Patrick Maloney,Origin Story: The Founding of Pandora Radio, Startup
Grind, https://www.startupgrind.com/blog/origin-story-the-founding-of-pandora-radio/
[https://perma.cc/P2FZ-V33Z]. Pandora allowed users to listen for free with ads, or to pay
a per-month fee to go ad-free. See Lauren Gil, History of Music Streaming, SUTORI,
https://edu.hstry.co/timeline/history-of-music-streaming [https://perma.cc/32XE-UA7P].
174 Charlie Sorrel, Spotify Launches in the U.S. at Last, WIRED, https://
www.wired.com/2011/07/spotify-launches-in-the-u-s-at-last/ [https://perma.cc/F7ZA-ZX
NY] (July 14, 2011). The European service’s United States launch was “highly
anticipated.” Alex Pham, Spotify Music Service Coming ‘Soon’ to U.S., L.A. Times (July 7,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/07/business/la-fi-ct-spotify-20110708 [https://per
ma.cc/ZBZ7-VAVR].
175 Press Release, Apple, Introducing Apple Music—All The Ways You Love Music.
All in One Place (June 8, 2015), https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/06/08Introducing-
Apple-Music-All-The-Ways-You-Love-Music-All-in-One-Place-.html [https://perma.cc/RM67-
YVJX]; Andrew Flanagan, Pandora Reveals Its Spotify Competitor, Pandora Premium,
BILLBOARD (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/7604144/pandora-prem
ium-reveal-spotify-competitor-streaming [https://perma.cc/ZVW6-497X]. It is of note that
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emerged to compete, including TIDAL, helmed by Jay-Z,176 and
Google Play Music.177 Neither has been able to seriously
challenge Spotify or Apple Music.178
The music industry experienced a financial decline due
to piracy, file-sharing services, and lower song purchase
prices.179 Physical music sales (e.g., purchasing a CD copy) have
further declined; downloads have also declined in 2016.180 While
this decline has at times been blamed on streaming popularity,181
streaming might actually be benefitting the music industry as a
whole. The U.S. music industry is “on pace to expand for the
second straight year,” which has not happened in almost ten
years.182 Streaming has even been credited for the rise in retail
spending in the first half of 2016, as “U.S. streaming revenue
grew [57%] to $1.6 billion in the first half of 2016 and accounted
for almost half of industry sales.”183
Evidently music streaming, whether free with
advertisements or via paid-for on-demand subscriptions, is not
going anywhere and will only continue to grow.184 Much like
iTunes is arguably the most powerful music retailer and yet needed to launch a streaming
service in an attempt to keep its reign of control on the music market.
176 See Andrew Flanagan & Andrew Hampp, It’s Official: Jay Z’s Historic Tidal
Launches with 16 Artist Stakeholders, Billboard (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.billboard.com/
articles/news/6509498/jay-z-tidal-launch-artist-stakeholders [https://perma.cc/VQ6L-S38P].
177 See Chris Welch, Google Launches Free Music Streaming Ahead of Apple Music
Debut, THE VERGE (June 23, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/23/8830629/
google-play-music-free-streaming-now-available [https://perma.cc/8V36-8Q8J].
178 See Ryan McQueeney, Which Music Streaming Service is the Best Right
Now?, NASDAQ (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/which-music-streaming-
service-is-the-best-right-now-cm659219 [https://perma.cc/V6T6-4NBZ]; see also Devin
Leonard, That’s Business, Man: Why Jay Z’s Tidal Is a Complete Disaster, BLOOMBERG
(May 28, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-05-28/why-jay-z-s-tidal-
streaming-music-service-has-been-a-disaster [https://perma.cc/PRY4-N89R].
179 Lucas Shaw, The Music Industry Is Finally Making Money on Streaming,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2016, 9:16 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-20/
spotify-apple-drive-u-s-music-industry-s-8-first-half-growth [https://perma.cc/4VL5-32XT].
180 Id. While this is bad news for some, streaming is helping the market as
a whole, being that monthly prices for on-demand streaming services average at ten
dollars per month, and one hundred twenty dollars is more money per year than the
average consumer would spend on CDs. See Ben Sisario, Amazon and Pandora to
Gauge Music Value in the Internet Age, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2016, http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/12/business/media/amazon-and-pandora-to-gauge-musics-
value-in-the-internet-age.html [https://perma.cc/W8QH-7VCK].
181 See Ben Sisario & Karl Russell, In Shift to Streaming, Music Business Has
Lost Billions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/25/business/
media/music-sales-remain-steady-but-lucrative-cd-sales-decline.html [https://perma.cc/
QVE7-GAQ2].
182 Shaw, supra note 179.
183 Id.
184 As a result of the growth of streaming, in 2014, the Billboard 200 changed its
chartingmethodology to account for streaming. HughMcIntyre, BillboardWill Change Their
Charting Methodology to Include Streaming, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2014, 10:00AM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/hughmcintyre/2014/11/20/billboard-will-change-their-charting-method
ology-to-include-streaming/print/ [https://perma.cc/NXW9-CTCL].
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music embedded in motion pictures and paid-for cable television,
this is not a change in the music industry that can easily be
ignored. It is therefore necessary that the consent decrees of
ASCAP and BMI reflect this change.185 Only then will it be
justifiable to decide whether the licensing of music should be
mandated on a full-work or fractional basis, as it does not make
sense to make industry-shaping decisions without taking into
consideration the landscape of the industry as a whole. Because
of the rise of streaming, physical sales and digital downloads are
on the decline;186 it is therefore pertinent that this change in
behavior be accounted for in deciding on a licensing scheme. Since
the recent licensing mandates have been based off of the consent
decrees of ASCAP and BMI, it is reasonable that the consent
decrees should account for this change in behavior as well.
C. Possible Avenues to Modernizing Music Licensing
Schemes
1. Elimination of the Consent Decrees
The most drastic solution to this pressing problem would
be the elimination of the decrees altogether. In favor of the
elimination of the consent decrees is the 1979 determination of
the DOJ that “entering into perpetual decrees was not in the
public interest.”187 Many of the decrees that were entered into
pre-1980 do not have “sunset” provisions, which “automatically
terminate [the decree] after a term of years, not to exceed 10
years,” though these pre-1980 decrees “cannot be terminated or
modified except by court order.”188 While the DOJ stated that it
will advise courts that most pre-1980 decrees will be presumed
to no longer be in the public interest, there may be limited
circumstances in which that presumption may be invalid,
185 See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 782
F. Supp. 778, 783–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“The [1950] amendment of the Decree
was . . . instigated by a number of related developments . . . television began to be
recognized as a potentially significant transmitter of programming to the American
public. It therefore became necessary to address the manner in which its use of
copyrighted music would be licensed.”).
186 See Sisario & Russell, supra note 181.
187 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. Announces New
Streamlined Procedure for Parties Seeking to Modify or Terminate Old Settlements and
Litigated Judgments (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/
legacy/2014/03/28/304744.pdf [https://perma.cc/AT2G-AH8X].
188 Id.
350 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
namely “when there is a long-standing reliance by industry
participants on the decree.”189
Unsurprisingly, the suggestion to eliminate the decrees
rises from the PROs themselves. In response to the Antitrust
Division’s request for public comment in 2014, ASCAP stated that
“the antiquated ASCAP and BMI [c]onsent [d]ecrees must be
updated, if not eliminated.”190 ASCAP argued that the consent
decree was originally motivated at a time where there was no real
competition in the marketplace, but today, ASCAP faces
competition from other PROs and its own publisher and writer
affiliates.191 Save for BMI, none of these competitors are restricted
by consent decrees.192An elimination of the consent decrees will put
all PROs and publishers on equal footing in the marketplace.
But this solution is not entirely practical. Considering the
main purpose of the decrees was to stave off the possibility of
antitrust violations, it is very possible that the government
would have trouble supporting the elimination of the decrees
without dismissing the risks of monopolistic behaviors.
2. Partial Withdrawal Permitted by the Consent
Decrees
Perhaps the most cited of suggested changes is
amendments permitting “partial withdrawals” by publishers.193
Partial withdrawal allows publishers to license to new media
platforms directly, instead of licensing through their PRO.194
This is in the best interest of the large publishers; it allows them
189 Id. It appears fitting that the BMI and ASCAP consent decrees would fall
under this limited circumstance, as they have each been relied on by the courts, and have
governed the PROs.
190 ASCAP, supra note 106, at 2. ASCAP contends that an elimination of its
consent decree is warranted “to ensure ASCAP’s licensing can meet the needs of today’s
competitive marketplace.” Id. at 10.
191 See ASCAP, Comment Letter on the U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Division
Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 35 (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/14/307803.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4D6-C6CU].
192 See Steve Schlackman, The Music Industry Overhaul: What You Need to
Know, ART LAW JOURNAL (Feb. 9, 2015), https://artlawjournal.com/music-industry-
overhaul/ [https://perma.cc/7FDN-PNBX]. Though SESAC, the third largest United
States PRO at the time of this writing, has had its own antitrust issues. See Radio Music
License Comm., Inc. v. SESAC, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 3d 487 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
193 Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 785
F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2015). Publishers belonging to ASCAP began to partially withdraw
their digital licensing rights from the PRO among concerns that ASCAP was licensing to
“new media companies such as Pandora” at a below-market rate. Id.
194 Chris Cooke, DoJ Expected to Support Partial Withdrawal in Consent Decree
Review, COMPLETEMUSICUPDATE (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.completemusicupdate.com/
article/doj-expected-to-support-partial-withdrawal-in-consent-decree-review/ [https://per
ma.cc/TD6F-EY4D].
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to have more control over negotiations, which effectively gives
them a higher monetary return because they could demand
“higher royalty rates for their material,”195 while not paying out
a portion of their collected fee to their PRO.
Courts ruled, however, that due to the blanket license
granted to licensees there is an all-in or all-out option only, and
publishers cannot license digital services in an entirely different
manner than that in which broadcast and other public
performances are licensed.196 For example, the Second Circuit held
that the consent decree precludes ASCAP from allowing partial
withdrawal. An allowance of partial withdrawal, the court
reasoned, would require rewriting the consent decrees “so that it
speaks in terms of the right to license the particular subset of
public performance rights being sought by a specific music user.”197
A downfall of partial withdrawal, and the reason it is not
an ideal solution, is that its allowance for digital services may
create a slippery slope into exceptions and carve outs for other
types of music users. For instance,
[a]llowing copyright owners to selectively withdraw from ASCAP and
BMI would substantially undermine the competitive protections of the
[c]onsent [d]ecrees by giving copyright holders the freedom to exercise
their market power. Ultimately rights holders would withdraw from
ASCAP and BMI with respect to all licensees for which the exercise of
market power would be beneficial to the rights holders.198
There is also a deep concern in regard to the financial liability of
digital services with regard to partial withdrawal.199 These
195 Ben Sisaro, Justice Department Plans to Begin a Review of Music Licensing
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/business/media/
justice-department-is-said-to-plan-a-review-of-music-licensing-rules.html [https://perma.cc/
JPC8-5VSH]. PROs and publishers argue that partial withdrawal would “afford greater
latitude in structuring license arrangements, ultimately benefitting copyright owners and
music users alike.” ASCAP, supra note 191 at 21.
196 Cooke, supra note 194. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., Nos.
13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 64 Civ. 3787 (LLS), 2013 WL 6697788, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2013); see also Pandora Media, Inc., 785 F.3d at 76.
197 Pandora Media, Inc., 785 F.3d at 77.
198 Steven R. Peterson, Ph. D. on Behalf of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters,
Comment Letter on the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Consent Decree
Review 2 (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/08/13/
307974.pdf [https://perma.cc/3S7T-Q7CF].
199 In a case of partial withdrawal from ASCAP, Sony put Pandora in a position
to be liable for an exorbitant amount of money, per infringement, for any song played
after Sony’s withdrawal from ASCAP. Balto, supra note 159. (“[I]n 2013 Sony withdrew
from ASCAP the rights to license its music to digital music services. During rate
negotiations, Sony refused to give to Pandora a list of the songs it owned. Not only did
Pandora have to negotiate without knowing what it was getting in the deal, Pandora also
could not remove Sony’s songs from its service if negotiations fell through . . . Pandora
would be liable for $150,000 per infringement for any Sony song that played after Sony
withdrew from ASCAP.”).
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concernsmake their way to songwriters as well, in that publishers
could potentially take advantage of songwriters if partial
withdrawal is allowed.200
3. Digital Music Service-Specific Provision
The consent decrees are rendered even more antiquated
today as they do not even account for digital downloads of music,
let alone streaming (which has overtaken digital downloads as
the most revenue-producing system in the music industry).201 A
digital music service-specific provision should be introduced to
reflect this industry change. Modification to include provisions
for streaming should be enacted in at least two ways. First, the
PROs must issue blanket licenses at a to-be-determined rate to
all digital music services that request one, and the license shall
be up for renewal after two years.202 Second, the rate courts
should determine the rate, which shall be the same for each
similarly situated user.203
The rates for digital music services should be marginally
higher than most other users because it is clear that some artists
do not wish to participate in streaming for financial
compensation reasons.204 Digital music services paying higher
rates to a PRO will increase the royalty payout to a composer,
which would likely lead to more artists consenting to streaming
their music. Such a pay scale would help to prevent copyright
owners removing themselves from their PRO, which would in
turn diminish the PROs’ business, because of what may appear
to be “mandatory streaming.”
200 The Songwriters Guild of America expressed concern to the Department of
Justice, and “[t]hese fears appear to be warranted, a leaked contract between Sony and
Spotify showed that while Spotify is paying most of its revenue to rights holders, a decent
amount of this revenue is being paid to Sony in such a way that it might not be going to
artists.” Id.
201 Joshua P. Friedlander, RIAA, News and Notes on 2015 RIAA Shipment and
Revenue Statistics, available at http://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RIAA-
2015-Year-End-shipments-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D76-GJBZ]; Sisario & Russell,
supra note 181.
202 The rationale of the two-year period for renegotiation is to account for future
changes in the music industry, including streaming services revenue and popularity,
standard royalty rates, and administration costs while still accounting for the time it
takes to partake in these negotiations.
203 In moving directly to the rate courts to determine a fair rate, the courts will
take several factors into account that will weigh the interests of the public, music users,
and copyright holders.
204 See, e.g., Taylor Swift, For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music Is A Love Story,
WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/for-taylor-swift-the-future-of-
music-is-a-love-story-1404763219 [https://perma.cc/EG5S-BYXR] (opining that “music
should not be free”).
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Licensing should be a seamless process for music users
while also providing PROs with flexibility in licensing to digital
music services. PROs requiring its composers to agree to license
to digital music services would lead to industry chaos. Such
mandatory streaming would likely lead to composers leaving the
PRO if they do not want to stream for compensation reasons.205
For this reason, the rate courts must establish rates for digital
music services that would allow for a composer or songwriter to
be paid amounts competitive to what they may receive for actual
purchases of the work via digital downloads or physical
purchases. As paid streaming is the way forward, it should be a
focus of the music industry.206 If it becomes the focus, streaming
services may have to increase the monthly fees charged to their
subscribers, but under the proposed consent decree
amendments, that increase would be up to their discretion.207
Such flexibility will aid in the rate courts’ ultimate
decision on fractional versus full-work licensing because it will
determine whether composers choose to withdraw from their
PRO. In a scenario where many do withdraw from a PRO, full-
work licensing may be appropriate to remedy the burden that
would be placed on music users. If many do not withdraw from
their PRO, it appears that the industry custom of fractional
licensing could remain intact, or alternatively, full-work
licensing may not be such an issue for PROs if they are receiving
higher monetary compensation than they were receiving with
fractional licensing before the implementation of this provision.
While this solution may be a step in the right direction,
the significant changes that might occur if the PROs mandate
streaming may be too forceful and unsavory for composers to
accept. Though helpful for the rate courts to decide on full-work
205 If those who did not wish to participate in streaming removed themselves
from their PRO, music users would hardly be able to keep track of who they must receive
a license from, what works they would be authorized to use, who does or does not accept
streaming, etcetera. Though it is likely that many artists and composers will continue to
want to stream their music. Success on streaming services is likely to be an incentive.
For example, Justin Bieber’s 2016 “album Purpose had over 100 [m]illion on-demand
audio streams in its release week.” NIELSEN, 2015 NIELSENMUSICU.S. REPORT 5 (2016),
http://nck.pl/media/attachments/317410/2015%20Nielsen%20music%20U.S.%20report
df.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6X8-T5L9].
206 Jan Dawson, RIAA Stats Means Music Industry Must Focus on
Subscriptions, VARIETY (Mar. 22, 2016, 5:01 PM), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/
riaa-streaming-revenue-music-industry-1201736586/ [https://perma.cc/NG5W-TA4W].
207 Research shows that many listeners are not willing to pay for streaming
when they can get it for free, and that cost is a big factor in decisions to not pay for
streaming. See NIELSEN, supra note 205, at 27. Downloads and physical purchases are
mostly continuing to decline, however, while streaming is continuing to rise and listeners
may find that if they want to conveniently listen to a wide variety music, a paid
streaming subscription will be their best, and possibly only option. See id at 8.
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versus fractional licensing, the uncertainty of whether or not
many composers will choose to withdraw from a PRO prolongs
the licensing scheme decision.
4. User-Specific Provision
A less severe, yet similar solution to the digital music
service-specific provision, would be amending the consent
decrees to require more specificity in licensing for specific types
of music users. Each type of music user has different needs and
potentially very different financial capabilities.208 Provisions
specifying licensing agreements to different groups of music
users are mutually advantageous to music users, publishers,
and PROs. A small family-owned restaurant, for example, may
not require a large sampling of music, and may not have the
means or the desire for a catalogue of one million songs. In this
sense, it would be best for them to be able to go to one PRO only
and receive a license to play songs from its repertory without
being required to go elsewhere for an additional license to the
musical composition. Whether this business receives the rights
to all of ASCAP’s repertory, which it could under a full-work
scheme, or only those works to which ASCAP has one hundred
percent control, under a fractional scheme, this type of business
should be able to choose its course of action. This would change
the requirement of issuing blanket licenses, but would be in the
best interests of many small businesses.
On the other end of the spectrum are radio stations and
streaming services. They may require access to millions of songs,
have the funds to pay multiple PROs, and have the resources to
acquire information on how many licenses they need and from
whom. This express dichotomy between music users should be
accounted for under the consent decrees because, although the
music landscape has changed, not every music user that requires
a license is a digital music magnate and it might be inequitable for
those users to be subject to changes that provide no real benefit.
This solution, while promising, does allow even more
room for error than may currently exist. It gives music users and
PROs many options, which may lead to unnecessary litigation or
rate court proceedings to determine fair rates. Further, under
this amendment, a decision on full versus fractional licensing
208 ASCAP’s website describes eight different types of businesses that future
licensees may select to determine their particular agreement with ASCAP.Music Users,
ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/music-users [https://perma.cc/5VKR-G92M]. These
types of businesses may serve as a guideline to the types of users that should be provided
for in the consent decrees.
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may not be required. Each provision for each particular music
user may state explicitly under which scheme it recommends or
mandates the licenses to be obtained. While in theory this seems
like an easily achievable undertaking, there may be certain
exceptions for unforeseen subsections of music users who might
require a combination of services, for which full-work versus
fractional licensing would need to be negotiated, causing
unnecessary delay in licensing.
5. Implementation of a Central Database and Sunset
Provision in Lieu of Amendment
If the consent decrees are not amended to fit in with the
digital age of music, they should continue to exist without
explicit determination of whether a full-work or fractional
scheme is necessary.209 In order to put the industry in a more
certain place than it stands at the moment, it would be helpful
to mandate a committee amongst all PROs to create and
maintain a universal database that allows music users to clearly
access and understand which PROs they must obtain a license
from in order to play certain works.210
A sunset provision211 mandating that the DOJ implement
a firm termination date of the consent decrees, or alternatively,
review the consent decrees on a specific time interval, would be
209 This would be most in tune with BMI’s rate court decision that “[t]he Consent
Decree neither bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing,” but would also
mean that the consent decrees neither bar full-work licensing nor require fractional
licensing. United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 3d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Further, in its remarks, the Department of Justice stated that “the industry has largely
avoided a definitive determination of whether ASCAP and BMI offered full-work or
fractional licenses because the vast majority of music users obtain a license from ASCAP,
BMI, and SESAC.” Antitrust Division’s Closing Review, supra note 20, at 9.
210 Currently, BMI, ASCAP, and SESAC all allow public access to their
repertory, however not all disclose their percentage in ownership of a specific work. It is
further complicated when one searches for a song and discovers complex charts and
industry jargon that make it hard to understand exactly who, and how many owners
control the copyright to the musical composition, if one must license from that PRO their
foreign affiliate, or the publisher directly. See ACE Repertory, ASCAP, https://
mobile.ascap.com/aceclient/AceWeb/ [https://perma.cc/42GU-55R8];BMI Search, BMI,
http://www.bmi.com/search [https://perma.cc/PL4B-75JS]; Repertory Search, SESAC,
https://www.sesac.com/repertory/ [https://perma.cc/8E73-8KAB]; see also Nicholas
Thomas DeLisa, Note, You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory
Synchronization Licensing on User-generated Content Platforms, 81 BROOK. L. REV.
1275, 1290–91 (discussing how YouTube, a music user, cannot know whether any of its
users have properly cleared the use of a master recording or composition before
uploading a video because “licensing databases do not communicate with YouTube.”).
211 A provision implemented “under which a governmental agency or program
automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed.”
Sunset Law, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For the consent decrees, this
would mean either a termination of the decrees at a fixed date, or a formal review of the
decrees to take place one per period specified within such provision of the decree.
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a warranted amendment if no other changes were accounted for.
A sunset provision would allow PROs, publishers, and music
users a chance to account for unforeseen changes in the music
landscape in the future. This does not have to mean an end to
the consent decrees, but rather an assurance that they will be
reviewed regularly and calls for change will be taken seriously.
ASCAP and BMI announced that they are working
together to create a centralized database of their combined
repertories with an anticipated launch in the fourth quarter of
2018.212 While this fits with this proposed solution, it does not
account for the shares of musical compositions owned by other
PROs. In July 2017, Representative James F. Sensenbrenner
introduced the Transparency in Music Licensing and Ownership
Act to the House.213 Though not yet passed, this Act would
mandate the creation of a comprehensive database under the
maintenance of the Copyright Office.214 While seemingly a giant
leap in the right direction, this Act is not without its critics due to
the strict implications imposed on composers and publishers.215
D. The Recommended Solution: Independent PRO
Licensing Committees
A provision in the consent decrees to require each PRO to
have a separate committee is in the best interest of all parties.
A governing body should oversee these committees, which
should each contain a combination of company executives (from
that particular PRO) and disinterested antitrust experts as well
as music industry stakeholders, so that concerns of all parties
are addressed. Further, because ASCAP and BMI are not the
only PROs, but the only PROs subject to consent decrees, these
212 Press Release, ASCAP, ASCAP & BMI Announce Creation of a New
Comprehensive Musical Works Database to Increase Ownership Transparency in
Performing Rights Licensing (July 26, 2017), https://www.ascap.com/press/2017/07-26-
ascap-bmi-database [https://perma.cc/LM78-72ZA].
213 H.R. 3350, 115th Cong. (2017).
214 Id. (The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on July 20, 2017
“[t]o amend title 17, United States Code, to establish a database of nondramatic musical
works and sound recordings to help entities that wish to publicly perform such works and
recordings to identify and compensate the owners of rights in such works and recordings, and
for other purposes.”); see also Jim Sensenbrenner, Transparency in Music Licensing Helps
Small Businesses, MORNING CONSULT (July 21, 2017), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/
transparency-music-licensing-helps-small-business/ [https://perma.cc/4KUK-689U].
215 Robert Levine, Federal ‘Transparency’ Bill Endangers Songwriters’ Leverage
for Getting Paid, Billboard (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/
7898132/federal-transparency-bill-songwriters-rights-payment [https://perma.cc/G5L5-
UZ6Z]. The Act would require that all copyright owners supply and maintain the
information to be put into the database in order to recover any damages other than
injunctive relief and actual damages, for copyright infringement connected to the public
performance, reproduction and distribution rights. H.R. 3550(d)(1).
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committees should be instated in each PRO registered in the
United States via legislative action.
The committee would be responsible for reviewing license
issues to determine an allowance of partial withdrawal if the
specific instance has merit, and for spearheading the
development and maintenance of a comprehensive database of
copyright holders to each work in the PROs’ collective repertories.
These individual databases would then be compiled into one by
the joint efforts of all the PRO committees. These committees
would confirm fair compensation, but would not, however, be able
to solve discrepancies with regard to fair rates for specific
licenses, as they could not be impartial as each committee
represents a designated PRO. Therefore, resolution of any conflict
would still remain with the rate courts.
These committees should also deal exclusively with
licensing to streaming and Internet radio services for their
respective PROs. The purpose is to provide assurance that all
publishers belonging to a PRO would have someone to specifically
advocate for their licensing desires to particular music users. The
committee could advocate for a composer who wanted higher pay
from a streaming service. This would eliminate the need for
partial withdrawal. Music users would be advantaged, as the
PRO from which they license holds the responsibility to
communicate any pertinent information regarding potential
restrictions on their license. This system would incentivize
publishers to sign with, and stick with, a PRO because they can
feel confident that their needs will be fairly considered, thus
making the system more transparent and fair for music users.
This committee will aid in a decision on full versus
fractional licensing, though it does not provide a firm decision
one way or the other. On the one hand, a large issue with
fractional licensing is the difficulty for music users in knowing
all of the different owners from whom they need to obtain a
license; the database to be implemented here would help. On the
other hand, with the committee reviewing licensing disputes
before litigation begins, they may be in the best position to
determine that, under the supervision of the committee to ensure
fair compensation, a full licensing scheme is entirely workable.
The lack of licensing scheme decision here is purposeful.
There is a strong likelihood of a continued back and forth via
appeals and proposed legislation that may be extended and costly
as both sides fight for their favored scheme. Under this solution,
both schemes can be operable at the determination of the parties
involved. Fractional licensing can persist if the committees come
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together to create a master database of copyright ownership,
while full licensing may be appropriate in certain circumstances
where fair compensation is all but guaranteed.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to imagine a world without digital music
services. If the agreements that bind the two largest American
music licensors do not account for digital music services, they
are not consistent with today’s music landscape. When there is
an integral part of the music consumption process missing from
a governing document, it is hard to imagine how the practices of
the music industry can be adequately regulated.
A decision on full-work versus fractional licensing has the
ability to alter the entire music industry, from what songs are
played on the radio down to how much a musician is paid in
royalties. Reliance on antiquated documents to make this
decision does not fit with today’s music landscape, past
practices, or public policy. As such, the consent decrees imposed
on BMI and ASCAP must be amended to fit with the digital age
of music before any consideration of mandating a licensing
scheme. Amendments will help to ensure fair compensation for
composers and artists, as well as a decrease in litigation for
music users. Then, listeners may never again have to suffer a
seven-month wait for Adele’s newest album to stream.216
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